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160 abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence that supports the view that the quality of 
institutions is an important determinant of long-term growth in European coun-
tries. It shows that an initial high government debt level coupled with institutional 
quality below the EU average tends to be associated with particularly poor long-
term real growth performance. Interestingly, the detrimental effect of high debt 
levels on long-term growth seems cushioned by the presence of very sound institu-
tions. The paper offers some evidence that sound institutions may be particularly 
important for long-term growth in countries in which the exchange rate tool is no 
longer available and less so in countries with flexible exchange rate regimes. The 
empirical findings on the importance of institutions are robust to various meas-
ures of output growth, different measures of institutional indicators, different sam-
ple sizes, different country groupings and to the inclusions of additional control 
variables. 
Keywords: quality of institutions and real growth, real convergence in the EU, 
public governance, structural reforms, public debt, panel estimates
1 IntRoDUctIon
During the past twenty years, European countries have witnessed very different 
growth performances. A significant part of these differences cannot be justified by 
differences in the initial levels of GDP per capita and the related catching-up 
potential. The ECB in its Economic Bulletin (ECB, 2015) argued that the quality 
of domestic institutions and governance has a positive impact on economies’ per 
capita income growth and that a lack of real convergence can be “related to several 
factors, notably weak institutions, structural rigidities, weak productivity growth 
and insufficient policies to address asset price booms”. 
Against this background, this paper investigates whether initial levels of the qual-
ity of institutions and public debt can help to explain the different long-term 
growth performances in Europe and why real convergence in the euro area seems 
to have been lagging behind. To answer this question, the paper builds on two 
strands of empirical analysis on the determinants of long term growth of a coun-
try: first the impact of the quality of institutions and second the role of high debt 
in affecting GDP growth. The benchmark model links long-term GDP growth 
with the initial levels of the quality of institutions, government debt (above a 
threshold) and an interaction term between these two explanatory variables. 
Long-term growth is defined as the 15-year average per capita output growth. 
While in growth theory this time span may not be sufficient to be qualified as 
“long-term” growth, in this paper we consider it sufficiently long to derive some 
robust conclusions for advanced economies. The quality of institutions is based on 
a composite index including four measurable governance indicators (taken from 
the World Bank): rule of law, regulatory quality, government effectiveness and 
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161try to capture how well national administrative and governmental institutions that 
determine the environment for economic activities are able to deliver a level-
playing field for all economic actors, prevent rent extraction and waste of resources, 
and ensure sound economic incentives for investment, innovation and the provision 
of public goods. Public debt enters in the benchmark model as a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one only when public debt is above certain thresholds. 
The benchmark model is estimated for EU countries, EU plus non-EU OECD and 
for two sub-groups of countries: countries with fixed exchange rate regimes and 
those belonging to the euro area, and countries with flexible exchange rate regimes. 
Results are also shown for the EU excluding Greece and for the EU excluding the 
CEEC countries which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, given the very different 
levels of institutions and debt in the two groups of countries. The sample period 
includes annual data from 1995 until 2017. Given that the target variable – poten-
tial output growth – includes 15 years of data, the explanatory variables run from 
1995 until 2002. The econometric approach consists of pooled mean estimates 
that account for autocorrelation of errors across time, as the 15-year average per 
capita output growth series are overlapping. The last 15-year average per capita 
output growth, e.g. 2002-2017, includes two years of forecasts taken from the 
European Commission database. 
Various robustness exercises have been carried out to enhance the robustness of 
the results and partly also to control for the risk of reverse causality, for example 
the use of different proxies for institutional quality, the introduction of additional 
control variables in the equation. Moreover, the fact that the institutional variable 
enters the equation as initial condition at time t, to explain the subsequent 15-year 
average per capita GDP growth, may also tend to alleviate the problem of reverse 
causality. To test for the possibility that both institutional delivery and long-term 
growth are affected by deeper country-specific characteristics, the estimates are 
also carried out with 2SLS instrumental variables, using legal origin dummies as 
instruments for institutional delivery. This approach confirms the results of the 
benchmark model, despite instruments not always being significant. This supports 
the view that causality seems indeed to run from institutions to long-term growth. 
The findings of the paper tend to support the view that the quality of institutions is 
an important determinant of long-term growth. The results seem particularly im-
portant for countries where institutional delivery is below or around the EU aver-
age and initial public debt is above a certain threshold (e.g. 60 or 70%). To the 
extent that causality is indeed running from institutions to subsequent long-term 
growth, such countries could experience significantly higher per capita GDP 
growth if their institutions were improved. Interestingly, the presence of very 
sound institutions appears able to offset the detrimental effect of high debt on 
long-term growth. While this result needs to be treated carefully as it is driven by 
rather few observations, it might suggest that the debt thresholds above which 
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162 be endogenous to the quality of public institutions. A possible narrative consistent 
with these findings could be that sound institutions may help alleviate the debt 
problem via various channels. For example good institutions may (i) allow for a 
better (potential growth enhancing) use of government expenditures financed by 
debt (e.g. the Scandinavian example); (ii) promote stronger growth via sound 
structural policies; (iii) promote social fairness and allow for more efficient tax 
administration, thereby reducing the economic and social costs associated with 
high debt; and/or (iv) ensure that episodes of large increases in debt are followed 
by sufficiently strong consolidation policies in the subsequent years. Empirical 
analysis testing for the above channels is beyond the scope of this paper and left 
for future research. 
While the results hold across different group of countries, it appears that the con-
ditions for real convergence are also generally good for the group of euro area and 
fixed exchange rate countries (for short fixed exchange rate group). At the same 
time the quality of institutions seems particularly important for this group. While 
these results are preliminary and require further research, this could reflect that 
sound institutions – and the associated policies – help to compensate for the lack 
of the exchange rate tool as adjustment and disciplinary device, supporting the 
view that improvements in institutions and the associated structural reforms are 
particularly important for euro area countries to be able to reap the full benefits of 
monetary union. 
The benchmark model is changed in several ways to check the robustness of the 
results. First the results are assessed against different debt thresholds (correspond-
ing to the EU average, the Maastricht threshold and the EA average); second the 
model is augmented with the different control variables typically included in the 
growth literature (such as education attainment, saving rate and government 
expenditure); third, other measures of institutional quality are used as a proxy for 
institutional delivery, which allow for extending the sample period considered by 
20 years, i.e. advancing the starting date from 1995 to 1975. These changes 
continue to support the evidence that institutional delivery is a critical determinant 
of long-term growth in Europe; however the significance of debt thresholds turns 
out to be less robust to the above changes. 
Various robustness exercises are also reported by using different measures of 
long-term growth and different time-spans. Also, these exercises show that the 
estimates obtained with the benchmark model are relatively robust to changes in 
specifications. This is particularly the case for institutional delivery and its inter-
action with the debt dummy. 
There are of course many factors that are not or only partially included in the 
institutional variables used here, which can enhance longer-term growth. These 
would include macroeconomic stability, prudent fiscal policies, efficient set-up of 
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163human and real capital, a high degree of flexibility and openness in product and 
labour markets, well capitalised and supervised financial institutions, efficient in-
solvency frameworks, conditions for an efficient use of capital and labour in the 
economy, including via economic integration within the EU. The results of this 
paper are broadly consistent with the view that the Word Bank (or other) indica-
tors measuring the quality of institutions cover key factors and mechanisms, 
which also determine the probability that governments and societies will in the 
future support sound policies and reforms in the above areas, enhancing long-term 
growth. The link between institutional quality and the probability of supporting 
sound policies and reforms in Europe that enhance long-term growth has however 
not been tested explicitly in this paper. It is left for further research. 
2 lIteRatURe oVeRVIeW
European countries continue to experience quite different long term GDP growth 
rates, even when accounting for different catching-up potentials related to the ini-
tial levels of per capita GDP. Regarding the euro area countries, in the July 2015 
edition of the Economic Bulletin the ECB summarises its assessment of the real 
convergence and the (lack of) catching-up as follows: “…The global financial cri-
sis that started in 2008 has showed that some countries participating in the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU) had severe weaknesses in their structural and 
institutional set-up. This has resulted in a large and protracted fall in real per capita 
income levels in these countries since 2008. While there has been real convergence 
in the European Union (EU) as a whole since 1999 owing to the catching up of 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies, there has been no process of real 
convergence among the 12 countries that adopted the euro in 1999 and 2001”. 
Against this background, this paper specifically investigates the role of two initial 
conditions in explaining long-term growth differences: the quality of national 
public and economic institutions and the level of public sector debt. The various 
specifications used can be considered part of the vast empirical analysis testing the 
notion of conditional convergence; that is the relationship between growth rates 
and initial conditions. 
The paper provides evidence which is consistent with the view that conditions for 
real convergence are in principle good for countries that no longer have the nomi-
nal exchange rate tool (i.e. the group of euro area and fixed exchange rate coun-
tries). At the same time the quality of institutions appears very important for long-
run growth in general and seems particularly important for this group of countries 
and/or for countries with initial debt above a certain threshold.
The crucial role of sound and efficient institutions – sometimes also referred to as 
good governance – in explaining long-run growth was formalised in a number of 
contributions in early 2000s, showing that countries with weaker institutions find it 
harder to sustain growth and are more vulnerable to periods of crisis and stagnation 
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164 using a number of historical episodes, how institutions are able to determine the 
incentives of, and the constraints on, economic actors and shape long-term eco-
nomic outcomes. In Acemoglu et al. (2004) economic institutions are identified 
with the structure of property rights and the access to economic resources. Thus, 
good economic institutions are those that provide security of property rights and 
relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross-section of society. 
The historical episodes analysis also shows that strong institutions, democracy, 
transparency and political stability bring about reduced output volatility. 
In this paper, we use a definition of economic institutions similar to that in Acemo-
glu et al. (2004). It is based on four measurable governance indicators (taken from 
the World Bank Indicators): rule of law, regulatory quality, government effective-
ness and control of corruption. These indicators try to capture how the economic 
structure is able to deliver a level-playing field for all economic actors, ensure that 
rent extraction and waste of resources are limited and sound economic incentives 
are in place for encouraging people to invest, innovate, save, solve problems of 
collective actions and provide public goods. 
As well emphasized by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), when dealing with institu-
tional variables, the problem of their endogeneity to macroeconomic outcomes 
arises, also on account of the fact that these variables have been generally meas-
ured ex-post. Hall and Jones (1999) also stress the endogenous nature of institu-
tions, arguing that institutions might themselves depend on the level of output per 
worker in an economy. This implies that any research involving institutional vari-
ables requires a significant amount of robustness checks. In this paper, we use 
2SLS instrumental variables, using legal origin dummies as instruments for insti-
tutional delivery, following La Porta et al. (1999) as well as other robustness 
checks, i.e. different measures of institutions and the inclusion of other structural 
control variables. By using legal origins we test the hierarchy of institutions 
hypothesis (Acemouglu et al., 2004), according to which institutions, while they 
do affect economic performance, are in turn both directly and indirectly influ-
enced by political institutions. Our approach is similar to that of Eicher and 
Leukert (2009), who use a set of political institutions variable as instruments for 
economic institutions. However, our instruments do not suffer from an ex-post 
measurement bias, as they refer to the legal origins of a country. In a similar vein, 
Hall and Jones (1999) used location and language differences to instrument insti-
tutions and showed that differences in output per worker in a sample comprising 
127 countries (OECD and developing) are driven by differences in institutions 
and government policies, which they refer to as social infrastructure. It should be 
noted that using legal origins as an instrument has been also subject to criticism, 
as the legal transplantation process appears to have been historically more impor-
tant than the legal origins for explaining the economic developments of countries 
(Berkowitz, Pistor and Richard, 2003). As an alternative instrument “human 
genetic diversity” has been recently used to investigate the impact of corruption 
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165also suffers from several limitations, in particular related to possible large meas-
urement errors (Ashraf and Galor, 2013). 
Our approach does not aim to explain differences in the level but in the growth rate 
of per capita GDP. When limiting the attention to Europe, there has been a rela-
tively large amount of empirical work on the convergence across countries; how-
ever not much attention has been devoted to differences in economic institutions as 
explanatory factor. For example, substantial empirical work has been done to 
assess the convergence of transition economies of Eastern European countries 
(Rapacki and Próchniak, 2009), based on a traditional set of macroeconomic and 
structural variables. Other work has focused on the identification of “convergence 
clubs”, i.e. country groups within the EU which have in common the level of real 
income per capita (Borsi and Metiu, 2013), derived from a neoclassical growth 
model augmented with endogenous technological progress. Borsi and Metiu (2013) 
found that regional linkages seem to play a significant role in determining the for-
mation of convergence clubs and that euro area countries belong to distinct sub-
groups, thus clustering is not necessarily related to EMU membership. By 2008, 
the Commission (2008) had already pointed out that the catching-up processes 
have been somewhat lower in the EMU than outside it, even when accounting for 
differences in the initial levels of GDP per capita. Most recently, by means of a 
counterfactual analysis, using synthetic control methodology, Fernandez and Garcia 
Perea (2015) argued that the adoption of the euro did not produce the expected 
permanent increase in the GDP per capita growth rate. While their model does not 
allow an explanation of why this happened, the authors refer to the lack of rise in 
intra trade and to the lack of policies to boost productivity as potential causes. 
However, empirical work on the institutional determinants of longer-term growth 
performance of euro area countries has been so far relatively limited. This is mainly 
due to the fact that the euro area history is new, and fifteen years of monetary union 
may seem rather short for any long-term growth theory to be properly applicable. 
This also implies that work on growth differentials and governance in the euro area 
has so far been more of a narrative nature. For example, Fernandez-Villaverde et al. 
(2013) discuss an impressive set of qualitative and anecdotal evidence in some euro 
area countries on the interaction of euro area membership and the loosening of 
financial and borrowing constraints, and related disincentives for governments to 
reform. Their analysis does not include an attempt to provide empirical estimates on 
the impact of deep rooted institutional differences across countries. 
Much wider, however, is the empirical literature that links GDP growth perfor-
mance to structural variables in the OECD countries, in which typically each fac-
tor of a production function is directly or indirectly related to institutional or struc-
tural variables. For example, Bassanini et al. (2001) show how the accumulation 
of physical and human capital and policy conditions (e.g. R&D activity) affects 
growth. Similarly, Barnes et al. (2013) reports estimates for all OECD countries 
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166 wide range of structural policies. These estimates show the large impact of labour 
and product market regulations, tax systems, education, R&D and FDI policies on 
real GDP per capita. Our paper is complementary to the above mentioned litera-
ture. It focuses on the explanatory power of a parsimonious number of initial 
conditions on the subsequent long-term GDP per capita growth performance. This 
is done by looking at eight years of initial conditions, from 1995 to 2002, in terms 
of starting level of per capita GDP, government debt and quality of economic and 
public institutions, and for each point in time the subsequent 15-year per capita 
GDP growth performance. Moreover this paper adds a new dimension to the em-
pirical literature on long-term growth as it investigates the interaction between 
indebtedness and the quality of institutions. 
The link between debt and structural indicators has already been analysed from a 
different perspective, e.g. by conditioning debt sustainability analysis on a set of 
structural indicators (Wyplosz, 2007). Papers linking debt with growth have been 
numerous. Chalk and Tanzi (2002) highlight different channels through which debt 
can affect growth. In particular, high public debt can put upward pressures on inter-
est rates, which reduces private investment and thus growth; higher debt is ceteris 
paribus associated with higher expected future taxes, which can reduce expected 
after-tax returns on investment. Most recently empirical papers linking debt with 
growth found threshold values above which debt can become harmful for GDP 
growth (Baum, Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2013). These threshold effects, 
which are estimated to occur between 70 to 90% of GDP depending on the sample 
used and the definition of debt, have been found to be significant not only in the case 
of public debt but also for private debt (Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli, 2011). 
Contrary to Wyplosz (2007) this paper does not address the issue of debt sustain-
ability per se, but it shows that in the case of a relatively low quality of domestic 
institutions a high debt level tends to be associated with lower long-term growth. 
It also does not search for endogenous threshold values due to the fact that the 
time dimension is relatively limited (i.e. eight years), which implies little country-
specific variability of the debt series. The paper is organised as follows. Section 3 
describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical models and discusses the 
results. Sections 5 and 6 present a number of variants of the benchmark model and 
section 7 includes additional robustness check. Section 8 concludes. 
3 Data analYsIs
The empirical analysis is based on annual data, covering EU countries.1 The key 
variables of interest are: GDP per capita, government debt and an aggregate meas-
ure of quality of economic institutions. These initial variables are used to explain 
the potential GDP per capita growth over the subsequent 15-years. The aggregate 
measure of economic institutions comes from the Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors (WGI) database published annually by the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay and 
1 Luxemburg is excluded from the sample, as GDP per capita is not a meaningful variable, given the very large 
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167Mastruzzi, 2010)2. The full database contains six governance indicators: voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effective-
ness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. This paper focuses 
on the average of the latter four, which captures the quality of economic and 
administrative institutions, referred to as institutional delivery or institutional 
quality3, while the first two indicators are related to the political setting. The 
remaining variables (real GDP, potential GDP, population and government debt) 
are taken from the European Commission database (November 2015)4. 
CharT 1




































































GDP per capita PPP adj log in 1999
Remaining EU Early EA Overall (R² = 0.84)
Note: As diamonds early EA countries (i.e. countries that joined the euro area until 2001), as x 
other EU countries.
Source: ECB computation on EC data.
Chart 1 shows the level of per capita GDP (x-axis) in 1999, plotted against the 
15-year average potential GDP per capita growth (y-axis). The chart distinguishes 
between the early euro area group (i.e. the countries that joined the euro area up to 
2001 – early EA) and the rest of the EU. With an R² of 0.85, one can conclude that 
initial GDP conditions are able to explain a great deal of the variability in the 
subsequent potential GDP per capita growth. This is in line with the expectations 
that countries with lower income per capita will grow faster than countries with 
higher income per capita. Stronger GDP growth in the period 1999-2014 in the 
2 Available at < http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx>.
3 See Helliwell et al. (2014). 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts/2015_autumn_forecast_en.htm for EU-28 data is avail-
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168 rest of the EU can also be associated with the impact of the EU membership which 
took place in 2004 (Campos, Coricelli and Moretti, 2014). 
However, the chart shows that certain countries have fallen out from this simple 
prediction model. For example Greece, Portugal, Slovenia, Cyprus, Italy, Bul-
garia, Croatia show particularly high negative residuals while the Baltic countries, 
Romania, Slovakia and Ireland were growing very fast compared to their initial 
GDP level. 
In this paper the simple catching-up model shown in chart 1 is extended by con-
sidering institutional delivery and the level of public debt. Chart 2 shows the level 
of the institutional delivery indicator across the EU in two periods of time: 1999 
and 2014. This indicator refers to the World Bank 215 country sample, where a 
positive value means good institutional delivery. Its statistical distribution follows 
a standard normal random variable, i.e. with zero mean, unit standard deviation, 
and ranges approximately from -2.5 to 2.5. In this paper, we centre this indicator 
to the EU27 sample average in 1996. Chart 2 shows that there is a large variabil-
ity across the EU countries in terms of institutional quality, and that, as expected, 
richer countries enjoy higher institutional delivery. Interestingly however the 
chart shows a very large variability inside the early EA group (dashed bars) despite 
much more limited per capita GDP differences across this group of countries. 
Finally the chart also shows that during the past 15 years many of the early EA 
group (with the strongest drop in Greece, Italy and Spain) saw a worsening of the 
institutional delivery indicator. The analysis of the evolution of institutional deliv-
ery is presented in annex 1 with a diff-in-diff computation. This picture seems 
consistent with the findings in Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2013), which empha-
sises the disincentives to implement reforms after the stage 3 of EMU.
Chart 3 puts together the residual from the simple catching-up model (chart 1) 
and the institutional delivery in 1999, taking into account the level of the govern-
ment debt. This is done by representing the size of countries circles according to 
their government debt to GDP ratio. Chart 3 shows that the quality of institutions 
seem to matter most, in the sense that it is associated with subsequent relative 
GDP growth, for relatively high debt countries, i.e. for countries with government 
debt at least above 50% of GDP. When focusing on the euro area countries (white 
dots) a clear positive relationship emerges between the institutional quality and 
the residual from the simple catching-up model. This chart seems to indicate that 
institutional quality and government debt (above a certain level) could be two 
explanatory variables of the long-term GDP performance in the EU, and in par-
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169CharT 2 
Institutional delivery indicator (1999 vs. 2014) 






























Note: Average of four indicators: government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and 
control of corruption. Dashed early EA countries and blank rest of EU.
Source: Authors’ computation on WDI data.
CharT 3






















































Institutional delivery in 1999
Remaining EU Early EA Regression for Debt>60%
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170 Before econometric tests are made, the relationship between the variables plotted 
in chart 3, table 1 provides a summary of the key indicators at play. The table 
distinguishes between five group of countries: the whole EU, countries with 
government debt higher than the 60% Maastricht threshold, the countries with 
government debt lower than the 60% Maastricht threshold, the Early EA, which 
refers to the countries who joined the euro area between 1999 and 2001; and the 
transition countries, which refers to the Central and East-European countries 
which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. The table shows un-weighted averages 
across the different groups of the cumulated potential per capita GDP growth in 
1999-2014, the level of GDP per capita in 1999, the institutional delivery in 1999, 
2007 and 2014 and government debt in 19995. Across the variable reported it is 
interesting to note that higher debt level in 1999 has been associated with lower 
per capita potential growth. It also shows that institutional delivery decreased not 
uniformly across the various group of countries. It has been constantly falling in 
the high debt countries and in the early EA, constantly improving in the transition 
countries and falling since 2007 in the low debt countries.
Table 1
Key summary statistics of the indicators used in the regression analysis6
eU Debt<601999 Debt>601999 early ea transition 
countries
Pot. GDP per capita 
PPPadj growth1999-2014
80.24 95.04 55.91 49.02 126.05
GDP per capita in thsd 
PPPadj EUR1999
15.65 14.15 18.72 20.49 8.81
WGI Delivery1999 0.034 0.018 0.177 0.445 -0.624
WGI Delivery2007 0.091 0.058 0.157 0.359 -0.427
WGI Delivery2014 0.062 0.011 0.097 0.271 -0.376
Government Debt % 
GDP1999
52.41 37.67 76.01 69.13 32.38
Observations1999 27 16 10 11 11
Source: ECB computation on EC and World Bank data.
4 tHe eMPIRIcal MoDel anD estIMatIon ResUlts
4.1 tHe eU saMPle anD tHe MaastRIcHt Debt tHResHolD 
The correlations chart shown in the previous section (chart 3) seems to indicate 
that the quality of institutions may be more important to explain the long-term 
GDP performance in the early EA group than in the rest of the EU. The analysis 
has also shown that there is a high correlation between level of debt and early euro 
area membership. Against the above evidence, this section tests the validity of a 
parsimonious empirical model capturing the linkages between quality of institu-
tions and level of debt.
5 There is no European Commission data on the level of Croatian government debt in 1999.
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171The estimated benchmark model takes the following specification: 
 Δ yc,t = α + βy  yc,t + βD  Dc,t + βI  Ic,t + βDI  Dc,t  Ic,t + εc (1)
where:
Δ yc,t is the 15-year average GDP per capita growth computed starting at time t (i.e. 
log change of potential purchasing power (PPS) adjusted GDP per capita) with t 
running from 1995 to 2002 for country c.
yc,t is the log starting level of the PPS adjusted GDP per capita at time t for country c.
Dc,t is a dummy, at time t for country c, which takes the value of 1 if government 
debt is greater than a certain threshold. In our benchmark model we assume that 
the threshold is 60% of GDP (Maastricht threshold). 
Ic,t measures the institutional delivery at time t for country c, the index is centred 
at the EU average level and we apply a 3-year centred moving average. This is 
done to include as many as possible back data, which prior to 2002 were available 
on a biannual basis. 
Dc,t  Ic,t is the interaction between the latter two indicators. 
Given that the last starting data point is 2002 the corresponding GDP growth 
interval, i.e. 2002-2017, includes two years of forecast, which is taken from the 
European Commission. For Bulgaria debt data are available from 1997 and for 
Croatia debt data are available from 2001 onwards. 
As a result the panel consists of 208 data points (25*8 + 6 + 2). Given that the 
panel’s GDP growth periods are overlapping, to account for autocorrelation of 
errors across time we use a pooled OLS regression with standard errors clustered 
across time. The choice of the pooled OLS regression instead of a country-fixed 
effect model is due to the use of the country-specific institutional delivery varia-
ble, which contains very little variability between 1995 and 2002, plays the role of 
a country-specific constant. 
We estimate the model by using both ordinary least squares and 2SLS instrumen-
tal variables. The latter method is used to account for the possibility that deep 
cultural, legal and political differences underlie different economic institutions 
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2004; 2005). Thus we decide to use the 
approach of La Porta et al. (1999), where legal origin dummies are used as instru-
ments for the economic variables.7 In view of the presence of the interaction term 
two instrumental equations are estimated in the first step:
7 In La Porta et al. (1999) countries are grouped according to English (CY, IE, UK), French (MT, BE, ES, 
FR, GR, IT, NL, PL), German (AT, DE), Soviet (EE, LT, LV, SI, SK, BG, CZ, HR, HU, PL, RO) and Scandi-
navian (FI, DK, SE) legal origins. As there are doubts about the Soviet legal origin of SI and HR, robustness 
checks have been carried out by using German origin for these countries (see annex 7). Annex 7 also reports 
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172  Ic,t = γ0 + γ1  yc,t + γ1  Dc,t + γ2  LOc,t + γ3  Dc,t  LOc,t + εc (2)
 Dc,t  Ic,t = δ0 + δ1  yc,t + δ1  Dc,t + δ2  LOc,t + δ3  Dc,t  LOc,t + εc (3)
where LO stands for legal origin. In the second step the fitted values of Ic,t in equa-
tion (2) and of Dc,t  Ic,t in equation (3) are plugged into the original equation (1).
Table 2
Estimation output of equation (1) 
15-year average per capita potential growth
explanatory variables ols 2sls
Log GDP (PPP)  -0.589***(0.0386)
 -0.611***
(0.0413)






(Debt>60) x Institutional delivery   0.131***(0.0283)
  0.123***
(0.0289)





Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The estimation results are shown in table 2.8 The table shows that the catching up 
effect, i.e. the impact of the initial level of GDP per capita, is highly significant in 
both regressions and, as expected, it indicates that higher initial GDP per capita is 
associated with subsequently lower long-term per capita GDP growth. Moving 
from one estimation method to another does not impact the significance or the size 
of the coefficient. The institutional delivery indicator is significant and positive, 
meaning that stronger quality of institutions is correlated with subsequent higher 
per capital long-term GDP growth. This result also holds for both estimation 
methods. Debt dummies are always negatively significant: higher government 
debt levels reduce long-term GDP per capita growth irrespective of the estimation 
method. Interestingly, the 60% threshold used for the debt dummy appears sig-
nificant. The interaction terms are positively highly significant. When looking at 
the debt dummy and at the interaction term jointly one can conclude that in the 
presence of high debt, an improvement of institutions is associated with higher 
growth potential, and a deterioration is instead associated with lower growth 
potential. This conclusion holds across both estimation methods. The main takea-
way of this exercise is that countries with high debt and low institutional delivery 
would be significantly better off if they were able to increase the quality of their 
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173institutions. For high levels of institutional delivery the model suggests that high 
debt is not a problem. This is the result of the inclusion in the sample of countries 
that had both high debt and very good institutional delivery between 1995 and 
2002 and robust growth afterwards (e.g. Belgium).9 
CharT 4






































































































Debt>60 Institutions Debt>60 x Institutions Residual 15yr growth excl. catching-up
Source: Authors’ computation on EC and World Bank data.
9 It is well known that Belgium conducted sound fiscal policies with high primary surpluses after joining the 
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174 Chart 4 visualizes the regression result of the first column of table 2. The indica-
tors are demeaned and transformed from log to percentages for better readability. 
The results are shown for the year 1999 (explanatory variables) and for the per 
capita GDP growth in 1999-2014. The chart shows in the upper panel all the con-
tributions and in the lower panel the contribution of institutional delivery, debt and 
the interaction term on the per capita GDP growth corrected for the caching up 
term. While the upper chart clearly indicates that the largest contribution to per 
capita potential growth is the level of GDP per capita in most EU non-EA coun-
tries, also the contribution of the remaining explanatory variables is important. In 
particular, the contribution of institutions and debt is generally more relevant for 
the euro area countries than for the rest of the EU.
4.2 cHanGInG tHe coUntRY coVeRaGe anD tHe Debt tHResHolD 
Our benchmark model (1) is also estimated by using different country groups and 
different debt thresholds. In this section we only consider the OLS estimates in 
view of the similarity of results obtained with 2SLS (2SLS estimates are reported 
in annex 3). 
Changing the country coverage allows to test if the three types of initial condi-
tions (GDP per capita, debt and institutions) used in model (1) change their sig-
nificance for different country groups and different exchange rate regimes. Table 
3 shows that when enlarging the group by other OECD countries (based on data 
availabi lity) the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients remain unal-
tered. The table also shows the results for 2 sub-groups: the euro area plus fixed 
exchange rate countries in the EU, and the countries (EU plus other OECD) with 
flexible exchange rates. It appears very important to test if institutional quality 
matters more in the presence of fixed exchange rate regimes, given that the 
absence of the exchange rate tools takes away a degree of flexibility, which would 
need to be compensated with structural reforms. While the significant drop of 
observations makes the results less robust, it seems that the model works better 
for the fixed exchange rate group than for the flexible exchange rate group. In 
particular, institutional delivery seems more important for the group of countries 
that have fixed exchange rates or are in the euro area than in countries with flex-
ible exchange rate regimes. 
The results seem to indicate that in the fixed exchange rate group (with 21 coun-
tries) catching-up conditions are slightly better than in the larger and mixed groups 
(with 27 or 33 countries), provided that institutions are strong. In the fixed ex-
change rate group the significance of the debt dummy drops; however the interac-
tion term remains highly significant, indicating that the quality of institutions is 
particularly important in the presence of high debt. Additional robustness checks 
for subgroups of countries are shown in annex 4. In particular, when considering 
CEECs alone, the variables on institutions lose significance, suggesting that insti-
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175up potential is still large, while initially other considerations (including the debt 
level) may be more important.10
Table 3
Changing the country coverage (OLS estimates)
 eU (27)













Institutional delivery     0.0951*** (0.0317)















   0.131***
 (0.0283)
   0.114***
 (0.0413)




Constant    2.127*** (0.0988)
   2.032***
(0.118)
   2.237***
(0.121)
   1.657***
(0.186)
Observations 208 246 160 86
R-squared 0.911 0.849 0.880 0.834
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other OECD: CA, IS, JP, NO, TR, US.
Flexible ER: CZ, GB, HU, PL, RO, SE, CA, IS, JP, NO, TR, US.
Fixed ER (early EA and fixed exchange rate and late EA joining countries): CY, EE, LT, LV, MT, 
SI, SK, BG, DK, HR.
Changing the debt threshold allows us to test whether the results depend on a 
specific debt level and if institutions matter differently for low versus high debt. 
Three cases are considered: 
– A dummy that takes the value of 1 when government debt is above 50% of 
GDP. This value was chosen because a value around 50% of GDP was the 
un-weighted average of EU countries debt level in 1999 (the average EU27 
debt level in the range 1995 to 2002 is 52% of GDP).
– A dummy that takes the value of 1 when Government Debt is above 70% 
of GDP. This value was chosen because a value close to 70% of GDP was 
the un-weighted average of Early EA countries debt level in 1999 (the 
average Early EA debt level in the range 1995 to 2002 is 71% of GDP).
– Government debt to GDP ratio enters directly in the equation, while the 
interaction term is constructed with actual debt in deviation from the 60% 
of GDP threshold. 
10 Annex 4 reports the estimates for the EU15 and the CEECs countries (transition countries in table 1) sep-
arately, to take into account the differences between the two groups in terms of GDP per capita, initial level 
of debt and institutions. The same exercise is shown for the whole EU and EU15 excluding Greece, to test if 
Greece could be driving the results. Table A7a in annex 4 shows the results are robust when considering the 
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176 Table 4
Changing debt thresholds (OLS) – baseline sample EU27
15 year average potential GDP growth (in PPP)
Debt threshold t=60
baseline
t=50 t=70 no threshold debt 
centred at 60% for 
the interaction term













   0.122***
 (0.0330)
   0.153***
 (0.0299)










   0.131***
 (0.0283)
   0.150***
 (0.0291)
   0.120***
 (0.0348)
     0.00291***
   (0.000571)
Constant    2.127*** (0.0988)
   2.080***
(0.103)
   2.154***
(0.102)
   2.013***
(0.105)
Observations 208 208 208 208
R-squared 0.911 0.926 0.900 0.917
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4 shows that the estimated model is robust to a change in the debt threshold. 
The institutional delivery term coefficient increases its size with the inclusion of a 
higher debt dummy. The debt dummy loses significance, however, when the 
threshold is set at 70% of GDP, while it gains significance when the dummy is set 
at 50% of GDP. The loss of significance might be related to the fact that between 
1995 and 2002 very few countries in the EU sample had debt levels above this 
threshold. As in the previous specification, this result seems to point to a rela-
tively higher importance of institutional delivery for the expected long-term per 
capita growth in the case of highly indebted countries. There are several possible 
channels via which institutions may alleviate the debt problem. Good institutions 
may (i) allow for a better (potential growth enhancing) use of government expen-
ditures financed by debt (e.g. the Scandinavian example); (ii) promote stronger 
growth via sound structural policies; and/or (iii) promote social fairness and allow 
for more efficient tax administration, thereby reducing the economic and social 
costs associated with high debt.
4.3 soMe coUnteRfactUal eXeRcIses 
For an intuition of what lies behind the estimated models a few numerical coun-
terfactual exercises could be useful. These exercises are carried out on the basis of 
the coefficient reported in table 4 with the three debt-threshold dummies. We 
consider five countries in 1999: two high debt countries with below EU average 
institutional delivery (IT and GR), a low debt country with below EU average 
institutional delivery (SI) and two countries with initial debt between 50 and 60% 
with institutional delivery above the EU average (FR and PT), but well below the 
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177In the first exercise (exercise 1 in table 5) we assume that these five countries had 
been able by 1999 to achieve debt below the debt thresholds included in table 4. 
According to the results reported in table 4 debt below 50% would have been 
associated with substantial additional annual real GDP growth over the period 1999-
2014. For example in case of initial debt below the threshold of 50% (60%) the as-
sociated additional annual real growth per annum would have been 0.8 (0.5) percent-
age points in Italy, 0.7 (0.5) p.p. in Greece, 0.3 p.p. in Portugal and 0.1 p.p. in France 
(as Slovenia had below 50% debt in 1999 this exercise is not relevant for this country). 
In the second counterfactual exercise, we assume a starting level of debt below the 
Maastricht threshold of 60% and in addition a convergence to the three best insti-
tutional delivery performers in the EU (e.g. FI, NL and DK).11 This starting posi-
tion would have been associated according to the models in table 4 with an addi-
tional 15 year average annual per capita growth of 1.5 percentage points per year 
in Italy, 1.4 p.p. in Greece, 0.7 p.p. in Slovenia, 0.6 p.p. in Portugal and 0.5 p.p. in 
France (table 5).12 
Table 5
Counterfactual exercises
exercise 1 – average annual growth impact of reducing debt to below threshold (in %)
It sI fR Pt GR
Model D50 D60 D70 D50 D60 D70 D50 D60 D70 D50 D60 D70 D50 D60 D70
Contribution 
debt 0.46 0.27 0.18 0 0 0 0.46 0.27 0 0.46 0 0 0.46 0.27 0.18
Contribution 
interaction term 0.27 0.24 0.22 0 0 0 -0.3 -0.3 0 -0.1 0 0 0.24 0.21 0.19
Total 0.75 0.51 0.41 0 0 0 0.14 0 0 0.32 0 0 0.72 0.49 0.38
exercise 2 –  average annual growth impact of reducing debt to below threshold  
and moving institutions to eU top 3 (in %)




0.87 0.73 0.47 0.59 0.85
Contribution 
debt 0.27 0 0.27 0 0.27
Contribution 
interaction term 0.24 0 -0.3 0 0.21
Total 1.45 0.73 0.47 0.59 1.4
11 Note that for PT and SI this counterfactual result is only associated with improved institutions, as the initial 
debt level in 1999 was below 60%, while for the other three countries the results reflect both lower debt levels 
and improved institutions at the start of 1999, compared to the actual values.
12 Comparing the first and the second exercise suggests that, e.g. in the case of Greece 0.5 p.p. higher annual 
real growth is associated with the lower initial debt level, and an additional 0.9 p.p. annual growth is associ-
ated with a much improved institutional quality, given debt below 60%. Given that the importance of above 
average institutions increases with the debt threshold, debt above the higher threshold (70%) coupled with 
very good institutions can be associated with even higher real growth. To remain on the prudent side, we do 
not think that this effect should be included in the counterfactual exercises, also as it seems driven by rela-
tively few observations. In any case, the counterfactual result of the impact of better institutions on long-term 
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178 5 eXPanDInG tHe oRIGInal MoDel
The empirical growth literature usually contains a much larger set of macroeco-
nomic variables included among the regressors. These variables do not usually 
cover the institutional set-up as captured by the institutional delivery indicators 
but other structural characteristics of the economy, such as the level of education, 
the saving rate, trade openness, the share of government expenditure on top of the 
initial level of GDP per capita (Barro, 1998; 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; 
Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). To check whether model (1) could potentially suffer 
from an omitted variable problem this section looks at the outcome of an aug-
mented model: 
 Δ yc,t = α + βy  yc,t + βD  Dc,t + βI  Ic,t + βDI  Dc,t  Ic,t  + βz  Zc,t + εc (4)
where Zc,t is a matrix which includes the following variables: trade openness 
(imports + exports in percent GDP); government expenditures (adjusted for bank 
recapitalization in percent of GDP); households savings rate; participation rate 
(labour force as % of working age population); level of education (percentage of 
the working age population with at least upper secondary education). These 
variables are typically included in regression analyses, which try to explain long-
term growth differences across countries.
Table 6 reports the estimation results of the expanded model (4). It shows the 
results of six variants of the benchmark model, by using an incremental approach. 
Table 6 shows that the institutional delivery and the interaction term remain highly 
significant throughout variants (1) to (6). By contrast the debt threshold dummy 
loses significance in four out of the six variants. Among the additional variables, 
table 6 shows that, while the sign of the additional variables is correct, only the 
level of education seems to have some limited significance in variant (6), while all 
other variables are found to be insignificant and are also not able to alter the valid-
ity of the original model. 
Overall, these exercises show that the parsimonious model seems relatively robust 
to the inclusions of additional macroeconomic/structural variables. The fact that 
the latter variables are not found to be significant might have different explana-
tions: first, this model aims at explaining growth performances across similarly 
developed economies while the additional variables typically explain growth dif-
ferences across developed and developing countries; second, some of the addi-
tional variables might present some degree of collinearity with the institutional 
delivery, this is particularly the case of education, which is not significant in (5) 
but only in variant (6); third, the time-span (i.e. 8 years running from 1995 to 
2002) implies that there is a relatively limited time-series variability which might 
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179Table 6
Expanding the original model for the EU27 countries 
15 year average potential GDP growth (in PPP)

































































































Observations 208 208 208 195 208 173 166
R-squared 0.911 0.914 0.914 0.925 0.912 0.897 0.922
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
6  eXPanDInG tHe saMPle PeRIoD anD testInG foR DIffeRent 
PRoXY of InstItUtIonal QUalItY
The relatively limited time variation, from 1995 to 2002, and the fact that institu-
tional delivery indicator moves very slowly through time might lead to the conclu-
sion that the time dimension of the results is relatively weak. Given the data limi-
tation on the institutional delivery indicator (only available from 1995 onwards), 
to test whether the quality of institutions remains an important explanatory varia-
ble through time, we use a series of proxies for this variable. In particular, three 
measures of institutional quality are available since 1975: economic complexity, 
the Chin-Ito openness, and the Fraser Institute Economic Freedom. 
Results are reported in table 7. The first column shows the benchmark model. 
Model (1) replaces our institutional delivery indicator by Economic Complexity 
index (ECI), model (2) by the Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index (KAOPEN), 
model (3) by the Fraser Institute Economic Freedom (EFF), and model (4) by the 
Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom (EFH). All these indicators are standard-
ised such that higher values represent better institutions and they are centred on 
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180 The ECI is a holistic measure of the production characteristics of countries, which 
embeds the knowledge accumulated and the country’s industrial composition. 
This information is used to create measures of the relative complexity of a coun-
try’s exports (Hidalgo and Ricardo, 2009). KAOPEN is a measure of a country’s 
degree of capital account openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006), based on restrictions to 
cross-border financial transactions. The EFF measures the degree to which the poli-
cies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom (Block, 1991). 
This latter concept is assessed against personal choices, voluntary exchanges, free-
dom to enter markets and compete, and security of person and privately owned 
property. The summary index measures the degree of economic freedom in five 
broad areas: size of government, legal structure and property rights, access to 
sound money, international trade and regulation of credit, labour and business. 
The EFH is based on 10 quantitative and qualitative factors measuring: rule of 
law, limited government, regulatory efficiency and open markets (Miller and Kim, 
2016). The first two indicators (ECI and KAOPEN) measure the quality of institu-
tions only indirectly (and in a more narrow sense) via the observed complexity of 
the economic system or via the extent to which a country is subject to financial 
transaction costs. Instead the other two indicators are closer proxies of institu-
tional delivery as they attempt to measure the efficiency of economic institutions. 
The last indicator in table 7 is available only since 1995, i.e. it covers the same 
time span as institutional delivery.
Table 7 
Expanding the sample period for the EU 27 countries

























































Observations 208 454 458 470 200
First observation 1995 1975 1975 1975 1995
R-squared 0.911 0.873 0.865 0.882 0.883
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7 shows that when extending the sample period by 20 years, i.e. advancing 
the starting date from 1995 to 1975 (models (1) to (3)) the role of institutions 
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181ing all specifications (i.e. also including model (4)), the significance of the institu-
tional variable is maintained. In models (1) to (3) one can also observe that the 
significance of the debt threshold dummy and the interaction term is notably 
reduced. Only in model (3) does the interaction term continue to be significant. 
Thus, from a longer term perspective, it seems that the quality of institutions mat-
ters more than the level of indebtedness and that the 60% threshold dummy itself 
does not play a role in explaining per capita long term growth since the 1970s. 
However, for EFF and EFH, which are a closer proxy of institutional delivery, the 
interaction term between debt and institutions remains significant. Given the longer 
time series used in model (1) to (3) it is interesting to test how an augmented 
version of the models would work. Tables A8 (1-4) in annex 5 report the results of 
the augmented versions of models (1-4) in table 7. The inclusion of additional 
variables follows the same principle used in table 6. Tables A8 (1-4) show that 
coefficient on institutions continue to be very significant, moreover the interaction 
term between debt and institutions remains significant together with three additional 
explanatory variables: trade openness, participation rate and education in most of 
the specifications. Finally table A12 in annex 7 shows the results for institutional 
quality as estimated by Kunčić (2014), where the institutional indicator is derived 
from factor analysis based on 30 available indicators. Even though the magnitude of 
the coefficients differs due to different scales, the overall message remains broadly 
unchanged also for this alternative measure of institutional quality. 
Overall, the extension of the sample period continues to support the importance of 
institutions for supporting higher long-term per capita growth. However, the evi-
dence on the importance of debt becomes weaker and the model’s specification 
seems to miss some explanatory variables when we go back to the 1970s. 
7 aDDItIonal RobUstness eXeRcIses 
In this section we report three additional robustness exercises to test the validity 
of our benchmark model. First, we use a variant of the model where the focus is 
on the interaction between the debt dummy threshold and institutional delivery 
from the countries which have below average institutional delivery; second, we 
test the robustness of the results by changing the measures of long-term per capita 
GDP growth and finally we change the time span of the target variable, per capita 
GDP growth, from annual to twenty-year average growth to see if the information 
content of the model changes for short, medium and long term growth. 
7.1 DIffeRent MeasURes of PeR caPIta GDP GRoWtH anD GDP leVels
Another robustness check consists of assessing the sensitivity of the model (1) to 
changing the measure of per capita long-term GDP growth. Throughout the paper 
the baseline measure of per capita long term GDP growth has been the European 
Commission (EC) estimates of the PPP-adjusted potential GDP per capita. The 
choice was dictated by the need to consider a trend variable and to correct it for 
the purchasing power (PPP-adjustment) of the different EU countries. However, 
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182 related to PPP-adjustment estimates some robustness checks on these two param-
eters are warranted. 
The robustness check is carried out by using four alternative measures of long-
term per capita GDP growth (table 8). 
Actual real GDP PPP-adjusted: in this case the EC PPP-adjusted potential GDP 
per capita estimates are replaced by actual PPP-adjusted GDP per capita figures 
(table 8 (1)).
Actual real GDP: in this case the EC PPP-adjusted potential GDP per capita esti-
mates are replaced by real GDP per capita estimates (table 8 (2)).
IMF Potential GDP: in this case the EC PPP-adjusted potential GDP per capita 
estimates are replaced by IMF potential GDP per capita estimates. It should be 
noted that the IMF doesn’t provide the full history for the countries that more 
recently joined the EU and euro area (table 8 (3)).
Potential GDP relative to the EU average: in this case instead of taking the EC 
PPP-adjusted potential GDP per capita estimates, we use for the target variable 
and for the explanatory variable the PPP adjusted GDP per capita relative to the 
European Union average (table 8 (4)).
Table 8 
Different measures of GDP growth and GDP levels



























































Observations 208 208 208 184 208
R-squared 0.911 0.896 0.799 0.766 0.776
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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183The results in table 8 show that the regression model (1) is robust to measurement 
changes of the 15-year average GDP growth. Generally, the catching-up coefficient 
becomes smaller when using other measures of per capita GDP growth while the 
institutional delivery coefficient becomes larger. The significance of the debt 
threshold dummy is somewhat reduced, but the significance of the interaction term 
remains intact. From these exercises one can conclude that the measurement uncer-
tainty related to “potential” and “PPP-adjustment” does not distort the results.
7.2 VaRYInG tIMe sPans anD staRtInG leVels
The final robustness check consists of evaluating to what extent the regression 
results depend on the starting level and on the time span used. This exercise is 
needed to test if the robustness of the results depends on the chosen sample period, 
both in terms of starting level used for the regressors and in terms of time span used 
for GDP growth variable. The robustness check is done by estimating 380 cross-
sectional equations (19 base years and 20 years of possible time spans) for equation 
(1) above. In other words, starting at the base year 1996, twenty cross-sectional 
regressions have been carried out on that base year to explain an average GDP 
growth that goes from one to 20 years. The results are shown in form of a matrix 
where the y axis represents the time span and the x axis the starting or base year.
Equation (5) modifies model (1) by changing the base year and the time span: 
( yc,t = Base+Span – yc,t = Base  ) = α + βy  yc,t = Base + βD  (D > 60)c,t = Base  + βI  Ic,t = Base  
+ βDI  (D > 60)c,t = Base Ic,t = Base   + εc (5)
Table 9 reports the values of the R² in equation (5). It is possible to observe that 
the explanatory power of the regression is larger the longer is the time span con-
sidered for the average per capita GDP growth. In particular the R² is relatively 
higher for average GDP growth rates that include more than 9 years of observa-
tions. The matrices with t-statistics of the explanatory variables are reported in 
annex 6. They show that the significance of the model is maintained for different 
base years and time spans, but the performance is better for a longer time-span. 
Overall this exercise suggests that the model is more suitable to explain long-term 
growth performances and not the business-cycle frequencies. It also suggests that 
the model would continue to perform well even when taking a longer time span 
than the one used in the paper. 
Given the above results a few variants of the target variable are considered in 
table 10. We test how the model performs for three measures of the long-term per 
capita GDP growth. First, we reduce the overlapping period and assume that we 
have only three different data points for the 15-year average GDP per capita 
growth (1996, 1999 and 2002); second, we consider the 23-year average per cap-
ita GDP growth and, third, we consider two non-overlapping 10-year average per 
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184 ble observations and basically the model is reduced to a cross-sectional analysis. 
This, notwithstanding institutional delivery and its interaction with the debt 
threshold dummy, remains largely significant. 
Table 9
R² of equation (5)
base
span
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1 30 26 43 15 56 49 56 52 62 61 77 58 45 31 41 47 24 31 48 1
2 26 32 28 39 57 64 64 70 68 76 75 73 49 43 56 45 31 46 49 2
3 39 33 38 49 68 68 74 73 77 76 81 69 52 51 52 47 42 50 50 3
4 39 43 50 62 72 75 76 78 79 82 77 69 57 53 51 52 46 52 4
5 46 55 62 70 79 77 81 81 85 80 77 71 57 54 55 54 48 5
6 57 63 69 77 81 82 83 86 83 80 78 71 58 58 56 55 6
7 64 68 76 79 85 85 88 85 83 82 78 71 59 60 57 7
8 69 74 78 83 88 90 88 85 84 82 78 70 60 61 8
9 73 78 82 87 92 90 87 85 84 82 77 69 60 9
10 77 83 87 92 93 89 88 86 85 82 76 68 10
11 82 88 92 92 92 90 88 86 84 81 75 11
12 88 92 92 92 92 90 88 86 84 80 12
13 92 93 92 92 93 90 87 85 83 13
14 93 93 92 92 92 89 87 84 14
15 94 94 93 92 92 88 86 15
16 94 94 92 91 91 87 16
17 94 93 91 90 90 17
18 94 93 90 90 18
19 93 92 90 19
20 93 91 20
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Table 10
Varying growth spans
average potential per capita GDP growth (in PPP)












































Observations 208 78 25 52
R-squared 0.911 0.904 0.936 0.843
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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185Finally, table 11 reports three cross-sectional results. The first is the one already 
presented in table 10, where the 23 year average per capita potential growth (from 
1995 until 2017) is regressed against the level of GDP per capita, the quality of 
institutions, the debt threshold and the interaction term. The second and the third 
replace the institutional delivery with the Fraser Institute Economic Freedom 
Index (EFI) described in section 6, which is available for a limited group of EU 
countries since the mid-1970s. In the second column, the results with the EFI are 
shown for the 23 year average potential per capita growth. This is done to show 
that the cross-sectional results are not significantly affected by the choice of the 
institutional indicator. In the third column, the results with the EFI are shown for 
the 35-year average per capita potential growth. While the very limited number of 
observations does not allow a robust conclusion to be derived, the results continue 
to be consistent with the view that the quality of institutions is an important deter-
minant of long-term growth. 
Table 11
Cross-sectional results
average potential per capita GDP growth (in PPP)


































Observations 25 25 13
R-squared 0.936 0.943 0.768
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
8 conclUsIons
This paper tried to explain the different long-term per capita GDP growth perfor-
mances in Europe by using a parsimonious empirical model, testing if and how the 
initial quality of institutions and government debt are important determinants of 
long term growth in Europe. The benchmark model explains long-term growth by 
the initial levels of government debt, quality of institutions (institutional delivery) 
and an interaction term between the two variables, on top of the initial level of 
GDP per capita (to account for the catching-up potential). The sample period used 
for the initial level of variables runs from 1995 to 2002, while long term per capita 
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186 The benchmark model is estimated for the whole of Europe, the OECD and for 
two groups of countries: countries with fixed exchange rate regimes and belong-
ing to the monetary union, and countries with flexible exchange rate regimes. The 
findings of the paper support the view that the quality of institutions is an impor-
tant determinant of long-term growth. The results seem particularly important for 
countries where institutional delivery is below or around the EU average and 
initial public debt is above the threshold of, for example, 60 or 70%. Such coun-
tries could experience significantly higher per capita GDP growth if their institu-
tions were improved. Interestingly, initial debt levels above 60% or 70% appear 
not to be negative for long-term growth in the presence of very sound institutions. 
While this result needs to be treated carefully as it is driven by rather few observa-
tions, it might suggest that thresholds above which debt levels are detrimental for 
growth are not the same across countries, but could to be endogenous to the quality 
of public institutions. 
While the results hold across different groups of countries, it appears that the con-
ditions for real convergence are generally also good for the group of euro area and 
fixed exchange rate countries. At the same time the quality of institutions might be 
particularly important for this group. This could reflect that sound institutions – 
and the associated policies – are helpful to compensate for the lack of the exchange 
rate tool as adjustment and disciplinary device, supporting the view that improve-
ments in institutions and structural reforms are particularly important for euro area 
countries to be able to reap the full benefits of monetary union. However, this 
result is preliminary and requires further research.
The benchmark model is changed in several ways to check the validity of the re-
sults. First the results are assessed against different debt thresholds (correspond-
ing to the EU average, the Maastricht threshold and the EA average); second the 
model is augmented with different control variables, which are typically included 
in the growth literature (education attainment, saving rate, government expendi-
ture, etc.); third other measures of institutional quality are used as a proxy for 
institutional delivery, which allow the sample period considered to be extended by 
20 years, i.e. moving the starting date from 1995 to 1975. These changes continue 
to support the evidence that institutional delivery is a critical determinant of long-
term growth in Europe; however the significance of debt thresholds turns out to be 
less robust to the above changes.
Finally other robustness exercises are reported by using different measures of 
long-term growth and different time-spans. Also these exercises show that the 
estimates obtained with the benchmark model are relatively robust to changes in 
specifications. The only variable where we observe a drop in significance is the 
debt dummy. This suggests that debt per se is not a problem but can become a 
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187There are of course many factors which are not or only partially included in the 
institutional variables used here, which can enhance longer-term growth. These 
might include macroeconomic stability, sound fiscal policies, efficient education 
systems and incentives for investment in human and real capital, a high degree of 
flexibility and openness in product and labour markets, well capitalised and super-
vised financial institutions, efficient insolvency frameworks, conditions for an 
efficient use of capital and labour, including via higher economic integration 
within the EU and a more active use of national policy tools to prevent asset price 
and credit boom-bust cycles. The results of this paper are broadly consistent with 
the view that the World Bank (or other) indicators measuring the quality of institu-
tions cover key factors and mechanisms, which also determine the probability that 
governments and societies in the future support policies and reforms in the above 
areas, enhancing long-term growth. The link between institutional quality and the 
probability of the above mentioned sound policies and reforms that enhance long-
term growth has however not been tested explicitly. It is left for further research.
Disclosure statement 
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188 anneX 1
analYsIs of tHe eVolUtIon of tHe InstItUtIonal DelIVeRY 
InDIcatoRs oVeR tIMe
This annex looks at the evolution of the institutional delivery indicators over time. 
The analysis is done by using the difference in difference approach, where the 28 
EU countries have been divided in five groups defined as follows: 
– Early EA-high: the early euro area joiners with the WGI in 1996 > 1.33
– Early EA-low: the early euro area joiners with the WGI in 1996 < 1.33
– New EA: the countries that joined the EA after 2001
– NOEA-high: the countries not part of the EA with WGI in 1996 > 1.33
– NOEA-low: the countries not part of the EA with WGI in 1996 < 1.33
The breakpoint of 1.33 was decided upon using a difference in difference calcula-
tion, where this cut off reached the highest R². 
WGI delivery (not transformed)
1996 >1.33 2008 2014
GR Early EA 0.70 0.60 0.22
IT Early EA 0.75 0.48 0.32
FR Early EA 1.26 1.43 1.31
PT Early EA 1.30 1.04 0.95
ES Early EA 1.30 1.11 0.85
BE Early EA 1.41 x 1.36 1.41
IE Early EA 1.64 x 1.72 1.69
DE Early EA 1.70 x 1.62 1.78
AT Early EA 1.79 x 1.81 1.61
LU Early EA 1.87 x 1.77 1.82
FI Early EA 1.89 x 1.99 2.06
NL Early EA 1.92 x 1.84 1.90
LV New EA 0.10 0.63 0.84
SK New EA 0.40 0.72 0.59
LT New EA 0.45 0.61 0.89
EE New EA 0.59 1.15 1.34
MT New EA 0.88 1.28 1.05
SI New EA 1.07 0.98 0.83
CY New EA 1.28 1.33 1.09
BG Non EA -0.41 0.05 0.08
HR Non EA -0.38 0.27 0.40
RO Non EA -0.17 0.02 0.15
PL Non EA 0.66 0.54 0.82
CZ Non EA 0.78 0.83 0.87
HU Non EA 0.78 0.80 0.48
SE Non EA 1.84 x 1.93 1.93
GB Non EA 1.90 x 1.68 1.77
DK Non EA 1.96 x 2.14 1.97
The charts below show the country group mean development of WGI-delivery over 
time (red line) and the linear fits split into three intervals: 1996-2001, 2002-2008 
and 2009-2014. The first row shows absolute values, the second row allows for 
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190 anneX 2
GeneRal GoVeRnMent Debt
The table below shows the General Government Debt in percent of GDP. Coun-
tries are ordered by debt level in 1999. Values larger than 60% formatted in bold.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2008 2014
BE 128.0 123.2 118.2 114.4 108.8 107.6  92.4 106.7
IT 116.3 113.7 110.8 109.6 105.1 104.7 102.3 132.3
GR 101.2 99.3 97.2 98.6 104.7 106.8 109.4 178.6
BG 97.3 69.3 76.1 71.2 64.7  13.0  27.0
AT 68.0 63.2 63.6 66.4 65.9 66.5  68.5  84.2
MT 38.7 46.6 51.2 62.1 60.9 65.5  62.7  66.9
SE 70.3 68.2 66.7 61.5 50.6 51.7  36.8  44.9
ES 65.6 64.4 62.5 60.9 58.0 54.2  39.4  99.3
FR 59.7 61.1 61.0 60.2 58.7 58.2  68.1  95.6
DE 57.6 58.8 59.4 60.0 58.9 57.7  65.0  74.9
HU 71.6 62.1 60.0 59.9 55.1 51.7  71.6  76.2
NL 71.2 65.6 62.5 58.2 51.4 48.7  54.5  68.2
DK 69.9 65.8 61.8 58.2 52.4 48.5  33.4  44.6
CY 49.2 53.2 54.8 55.1 55.1 56.9  45.1 108.2
PT 59.5 55.2 51.8 51.0 50.3 53.4  71.7 130.2
SK 30.5 33.0 33.9 47.1 49.6 48.3 28.2  53.5
IE 69.9 61.6 51.5 46.7 36.1 33.2 42.4 107.5
FI 55.3 52.2 46.9 44.1 42.5 41.0 32.7  59.3
GB 47.8 46.6 44.0 41.7 38.9 36.0 51.7  88.2
PL 42.4 42.3 38.4 39.0 36.5 37.3 46.6  50.4
SI 21.6 22.1 22.8 23.7 25.9 26.1 21.6  80.8
LT 13.9 15.4 16.5 22.7 23.5 22.9 14.6  40.7
RO 10.6 14.9 16.7 21.6 22.4 25.7 13.2  39.8
CZ 11.6 12.1 13.9 15.2 17.0 22.8 28.7  42.7
LV 13.3 10.7 9.0 12.1 12.1 13.9 18.7  40.8
EE 7.5 7.0 6.0 6.5 5.1 4.8  4.5  10.4
LU 7.6 7.5 7.2 6.4 7.6 6.6 14.4  23.0
HR 36.1 38.9  85.1
EA19 72.7 72.2 71.7 70.6 68.0 67.0 68.5 94.5
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191anneX 3
2sls estIMates
This instrumental variable approach requires that the instruments (legal origin) 
are relevant, i.e. they are correlated with the explanatory variable (institutions) and 
exogenous, i.e. they are not correlated with the error term in our regression of 
interest. In our baseline regression institutions appear both independently and in 
interaction with the debt>60 dummy. It can be argued that if legal origin is a valid 
instrument for institutions, then legal origins in interaction with the exogenous 
debt dummy is also a valid instrument for institutions interacting with the debt 
dummy. The relevance of the instruments used can be tested by checking if the 
F-statistic of the first stage is larger than 10. As shown in table A2 below this 
criterion is met with ease if we don’t enforce cluster-robust standard errors 
however the criterion is not met for the more robust approach.
Table a2 
First stage of 2SLS regression shown in table 2
explanatory  
variables
Institutions (Debt>60) x 
Institutions
Institutions (Debt>60) x 
Institutions
(Origin=English) Omitted Omitted Omitted Omitted

















































































Observations 208 208 208 208
R-squared 0.843 0.691 0.843 0.691
Clustered standard errors NO NO YES YES
F-stat of excluded instruments 14.41 37.86 5.354 9.282
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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192 Table a3
Changing the country coverage (2SLS)
eU
(27)












































Observations 208 246 160 86
R-squared 0.910 0.842 0.874 0.803
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Other OECD: CA, IS, JP, NO, TR, US.
Flexible ER: CZ, GB, HU, PL, RO, SE, CA, IS, JP, NO, TR, US.
Fixed ER (early EA and fixed exchange rate and late EA joining countries): CY, EE, LT, LV, MT, 
SI, SK, BG, DK, HR.
Table a4
Changing debt thresholds (2SLS) – baseline sample EU27
15 year average potential GDP growth (in PPP)
Debt threshold t=60
baseline
t=50 t=70 no threshold debt 
centred at 60% for 
the interaction term





























    0.00316***
 (0.00111)







Observations 208 208 208 208
R-squared 0.910 0.925 0.899 0.917
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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193Table a5
Expanding the original model (2SLS) – baseline sample EU27





























































































Observations 208 208 208 195 208 173 166
R-squared 0.910 0.913 0.913 0.925 0.912 0.896 0.919
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table a6
Expanding the sample period with different institutional indicators (2SLS)





























































Observations 208 454 458 470 200
First observation 1995 1975 1975 1975 1995
R-squared 0.910 0.855 0.716 0.803 0.883
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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194 anneX 4
cHanGInG tHe coUntRY GRoUPInG
Table a7 (a) 
Changing the country grouping
























































Observations 208 200 120 112 80
R-squared 0.911 0.914 0.659 0.675 0.862
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table a7 (b) 
Changing the country grouping (2SLS)













































Observations 208 200 120 112
R-squared 0.910 0.913 0.657 0.672
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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195anneX 5
eXPanDInG tHe oRIGInal MoDel WItH aDDItIonal VaRIable anD WItH 
DIffeRent PRoXY of InstItUtIonal QUalItY
Table a8 (1)
Institutions refers to Economic Complexity





























































































Observations 454 454 270 311 307 200 183
R-squared 0.873 0.901 0.866 0.900 0.896 0.840 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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196 Table a8 (2) 
Institutions refers to Chinn-Ito Index





























































































Observations 458 458 280 307 316 207 187
R-squared 0.865 0.875 0.842 0.885 0.889 0.826 0.920
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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197Table a8 (3) 
Institutions refers to Economic Freedom from the Fraser Institute





























































































Observations 470 470 286 319 323 207 187
R-squared 0.882 0.886 0.881 0.903 0.904 0.867 0.916
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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198 Table a8 (4)
Institutions refers to Economic Freedom from the Heritage Foundation





























































































Observations 200 200 200 187 200 170 163
R-squared 0.883 0.886 0.885 0.896 0.893 0.875 0.909
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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199anneX 6
t-statIstIcs of MoDel (5)
Table a9 (1) 
t-statistic of the catching-up term in equation (5)
base
span
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1 -2.9 -2.1 -2.7 -1.1 0.0 -3.4 -1.7 -1.9 -3.1 -2.2 -3.1 -3.3 -2.9 -2.3 -1.3 -1.4 -1.7 0.1 -1.0 1
2 -2.6 -2.9 -2.5 -0.7 -2.0 -4.0 -2.3 -2.8 -3.3 -3.0 -3.9 -5.0 -3.2 -2.5 -1.4 -2.1 -1.1 -0.6 -0.9 2
3 -3.5 -3.1 -2.4 -2.0 -2.8 -4.3 -2.8 -2.9 -3.6 -4.0 -5.2 -4.8 -3.1 -2.5 -2.2 -1.6 -1.5 -0.8 -0.9 3
4 -3.5 -3.2 -3.3 -2.7 -3.5 -4.8 -3.1 -3.3 -4.4 -5.2 -5.1 -4.5 -3.1 -3.1 -2.3 -1.9 -1.6 -0.9 4
5 -3.8 -4.1 -3.6 -3.4 -3.9 -5.0 -3.4 -4.4 -5.5 -5.1 -4.8 -4.3 -3.4 -3.2 -2.6 -2.0 -1.7 5
6 -4.6 -4.3 -4.3 -3.9 -4.2 -5.4 -4.5 -5.5 -5.3 -4.9 -4.8 -4.5 -3.5 -3.5 -2.8 -2.0 6
7 -5.0 -4.8 -4.7 -4.1 -4.7 -6.2 -5.5 -5.5 -4.9 -4.9 -5.0 -4.5 -3.6 -3.7 -2.9 7
8 -5.3 -5.1 -4.8 -4.7 -5.6 -7.8 -5.6 -5.1 -4.8 -5.2 -5.1 -4.5 -3.7 -3.8 8
9 -5.4 -5.4 -5.2 -5.5 -7.2 -8.0 -5.1 -4.9 -4.9 -5.3 -5.1 -4.4 -3.7 9
10 -5.7 -6.0 -6.1 -7.0 -7.6 -7.9 -5.0 -4.9 -5.0 -5.2 -5.0 -4.3 10
11 -6.0 -6.9 -7.5 -7.2 -7.4 -8.1 -5.0 -4.9 -4.8 -5.0 -4.8 11
12 -6.9 -8.4 -7.8 -7.2 -7.6 -8.4 -4.9 -4.6 -4.6 -4.9 12
13 -8.5 -9.0 -7.7 -7.4 -7.9 -8.2 -4.7 -4.4 -4.5 13
14 -9.0 -9.0 -7.9 -7.6 -7.7 -8.0 -4.5 -4.2 14
15 -9.1 -9.2 -8.2 -7.5 -7.4 -7.6 -4.3 15
16 -9.3 -9.5 -7.8 -7.2 -7.0 -7.3 16
17 -9.7 -9.1 -7.5 -6.9 -6.7 17
18 -9.1 -8.7 -7.2 -6.6 18
19 -8.7 -8.3 -6.9 19
20 -8.2 -7.9 20
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Table a9 (2)
t-statistic of the institutions term in equation (5)
base
span
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1 2.7 1.8 1.9 1.3 -1.7 1.8 0.1 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.1 -0.2 1.0 -0.8 -0.7 1
2 2.3 2.2 1.9 -0.1 0.1 1.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.8 1.9 1.4 1.0 -0.3 0.7 0.3 -0.7 -0.7 2
3 2.8 2.2 1.2 0.8 0.3 1.7 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.4 2.0 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.2 -0.7 -0.7 3
4 2.7 1.8 1.7 0.8 0.8 1.7 0.6 0.6 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.6 0.9 1.2 0.7 0.2 0.2 -0.6 4
5 2.5 2.1 1.6 1.2 0.8 1.6 0.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 0.9 0.2 0.1 5
6 2.8 2.0 2.0 1.2 0.7 1.5 1.2 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.2 6
7 2.7 2.2 1.9 1.1 0.7 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.1 7
8 2.7 2.1 1.6 1.0 0.9 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 8
9 2.5 1.9 1.3 1.1 1.1 2.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.6 9
10 2.1 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.3 2.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.6 10
11 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 2.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.8 11
12 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.5 2.4 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.5 12
13 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.5 2.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 13
14 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.5 2.4 1.0 0.9 14
15 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.4 0.9 15
16 1.0 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.3 16
17 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 17
18 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.4 18
19 1.0 1.4 1.2 19
20 0.9 1.3 20
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200 Table a9 (3)
t-statistic of the debt dummy term in equation (5)
base
span
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1 1.2 1.6 -1.5 -0.2 -2.1 -0.2 -0.8 -1.1 0.5 -1.7 -3.2 -0.5 1.4 0.3 -1.5 -1.7 -0.5 -1.6 -2.1 1
2 1.2 1.0 -0.2 -1.4 -1.1 0.0 -1.1 -1.1 -0.1 -2.5 -1.7 0.4 0.9 -0.5 -2.2 -1.2 -1.2 -2.0 -2.2 2
3 1.3 1.4 0.0 -1.0 -0.8 -0.5 -1.2 -0.9 -0.9 -1.2 -0.8 0.4 0.0 -1.0 -1.1 -1.6 -1.4 -2.2 -2.2 3
4 1.4 1.6 0.3 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 -1.0 -1.1 -0.1 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.6 -0.5 -0.9 -1.6 -1.5 -2.2 4
5 1.9 1.8 -0.1 -1.1 -1.3 -0.8 -1.2 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.9 -1.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.6 -1.7 -1.6 5
6 2.2 1.5 -0.5 -1.3 -1.2 -1.1 -0.2 0.2 0.0 -1.2 -1.3 -0.9 -0.4 -0.2 -0.5 -1.7 6
7 2.0 1.1 -0.9 -1.1 -1.5 -0.9 -0.1 0.3 -0.7 -1.7 -1.2 -0.8 -0.5 -0.1 -0.4 7
8 1.6 0.7 -0.7 -1.1 -1.2 -0.7 0.0 -0.4 -1.2 -1.7 -1.1 -0.9 -0.6 -0.1 8
9 1.1 0.8 -0.7 -1.0 -1.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.7 -1.2 -1.7 -1.1 -1.0 -0.6 9
10 1.0 0.8 -0.4 -1.1 -1.2 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 -1.4 -1.8 -1.1 -1.0 10
11 0.6 0.6 -0.5 -1.2 -1.2 -0.9 -1.2 -1.2 -1.6 -1.9 -1.1 11
12 0.5 0.6 -0.8 -1.2 -1.3 -1.3 -1.5 -1.4 -1.8 -1.9 12
13 0.5 0.5 -0.8 -1.3 -1.6 -1.2 -1.7 -1.5 -1.9 13
14 0.1 0.4 -1.0 -1.6 -1.6 -1.2 -1.8 -1.7 14
15 -0.1 0.2 -1.3 -1.5 -1.6 -1.2 -1.9 15
16 -0.4 -0.1 -1.2 -1.5 -1.5 -1.2 16
17 -0.5 -0.1 -1.3 -1.4 -1.5 17
18 -0.7 -0.1 -1.3 -1.4 18
19 -0.8 -0.2 -1.4 19
20 -0.9 -0.2 20
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Table a9 (4) 
t-statistic of the interaction term in equation (5)
base
span
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1 -1.3 -1.4 0.4 -1.2 -0.7 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.7 -0.4 0.2 1.0 1.9 1.9 0.8 2.6 3.0 1
2 -1.0 -0.7 0.1 -1.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.0 -0.3 1.1 1.5 2.7 1.4 2.1 3.3 3.0 2
3 -1.0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.6 3.4 3.1 3
4 -0.7 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.3 0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.6 1.1 1.9 1.7 2.3 2.7 2.8 3.4 4
5 -1.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.5 1.0 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.9 2.9 5
6 -1.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.4 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.9 2.1 2.4 3.0 6
7 -0.8 0.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.4 7
8 -0.5 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 2.2 8
9 -0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.1 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.7 9
10 0.2 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.9 1.8 1.4 1.6 10
11 0.9 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.4 11
12 1.4 1.8 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.8 12
13 1.6 2.8 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.0 13
14 2.5 3.1 2.6 2.6 2.2 1.9 1.8 2.0 14
15 3.0 3.4 2.9 2.7 2.2 1.8 1.8 15
16 3.4 3.7 2.7 2.5 2.1 1.8 16
17 3.4 3.5 2.6 2.5 2.0 17
18 3.4 3.4 2.4 2.4 18
19 3.4 3.3 2.3 19
20 3.4 3.2 20
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201anneX 7
aDDItIonal RobUstness cHecKs on tHe InstRUMents UseD
changing legal origin for croatia and slovenia
Below we report a change in the instrumental variable method, by replacing the 
legal origins of Croatia and Slovenia with the German ones, as there are doubts 
about the classification of La Porta et al. (1999). The table shows that changing the 
legal origin of these two countries does not change the results of the baseline model. 
Table a10
Modified legal origin
15-year average per capita potential growth
explanatory variables ols 2sls (lo) 2sls (lo mod)




























Observations 208 208 208
R-squared 0.911 0.910 0.911
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Using human diversity (ashraf and Galor, 2013)
Below we report the change in the instrumental variable method, using genetic diver-
sity as instrument. Compared to the original OLS and 2SLS legal origin regression 
the regression with genetic diversity has the same signs for the coefficients however 
less significant. The interaction term however is still significant at the 5% level.
Table a11
Human diversity instrumenting institutions
15-year average per capita potential growth
explanatory variables ols 2sls (lo) 2sls (gen. div.)




























Observations 208 208 208
R-squared 0.911 0.910 0.899
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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202 Using	the	institutional	quality	dataset	by	Kunčić	(2014)	
Complementary to the results presented in table 7, where we experiment with 
different proxies of institutional quality as opposed to the baseline specification 
using the World Bank indicators, below we show regression results with institu-
tional quality estimated by Kunčić (2014). Scores are demeaned in the first year 
and we are taking the average across the three dimensions legal, political and 
economic institutional quality, recorded in the dataset. Even though the magnitude 
of the coefficients differs due to different scales, the overall message remains 
broadly unchanged. For the OLS estimate significance levels are unchanged 
except for a slight drop for the debt dummy. In our 2SLS model specification 
institutions and the interaction term are significant at the 5 percent level. The mar-
ginal drop in explanatory power can be traced back to the longer time horizon of 
available data, starting in 1990, while the instrument is time constant.
Table a12 
Institutional quality as estimated by Kunčić
15-year average per capita potential growth
explanatory 
variables
ols 2sls OLS	Kunčić 2SLS	Kunčić






































Observations 208 208 277 277
R-squared 0.911 0.910 0.849 0.798
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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